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1. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 
 The theory of evolution explains that humans, like all life on planet Earth, are the 
products of millions of years of random genetic mutations and the pressures of natural selection. 
Consternation over the ethical implications of the theory of evolution is practically as old as 
Charles Darwin himself.1 Religious contemporaries of Darwin presaged civil unrest to inevitably 
follow the laity’s apperception of a natural origin of morality; some feared undermining beliefs 
in a divine source for moral laws would open a Pandora’s Box of unmitigated debauchery, 
listlessness, and an insouciance for political order.2 At the opposite end of the spectrum, there 
were those who embraced Social Darwinism, the position put forward most clearly not by 
Charles Darwin but a contemporary of his, Henry Spencer, that human ethics from henceforth 
should model the animal kingdom’s modus operandi of survival-of-the-fittest.3 Under this view, 
the highest moral good would be advancing the human species most swiftly. The allure sprung 
from the scientific authority to which proponents of Social Darwinism appealed.4 This entailed 
limiting the birth rates of peoples or races deemed “inferior,” the cessation of funding 
organizations established to help the sick and needy, and only allowing individuals of above 
average intellect, ability, and so forth to reproduce. This apparent ethical implication of the 
theory of evolution sparked the eugenics movement in Europe and America in the early twentieth 
 
1 See Darwin, 1874.  
2 See Smith, 1898. 
3 See Rogers, 1972. 
4 See Dikötter, 1998. 
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century. It also greatly undergirded Hitler’s antisemitism, Aryanism, and Nazi pedagogy under 
the Third Reich.5  
However, justifying certain moral imperatives due to their derivation from Social 
Darwinism, a practice now relegated to a field called Prescriptive Evolutionary Ethics, waned 
substantially by the mid-twentieth century for a few reasons. First, Prescriptive Evolutionary 
Ethics is one of the most blatant offenders of the “is-ought” fallacy elucidated by philosopher 
David Hume in the eighteenth century. The “is-ought’ fallacy is committed whenever a 
description of something is used as a justification for a moral imperative.6 For example, to say 
that a child is starving is the reason as to why someone should give the child food is to confuse 
an “is” statement with an “ought” statement. The child is starving; someone ought to feed him. 
While such connections are made often enough, there is nothing in the first statement that 
necessarily produces the second. This is all that propels Prescriptive Evolutionary Ethics: if there 
is a “superior” race, its survival ought to be promoted over others; if the terminally ill are being 
kept alive by resources that healthier people could benefit from, the terminally ill ought to be 
allowed to die off, etc. Furthermore, it is quite clear that a society that tramples on its weak 
cannot prosper. There is a collective social interest in supporting those who cannot support 
themselves; children, for instance, require years of extensive care by their parents before they are 
self-reliant. Given the poor foundation upon which Social Darwinism rests, most ethicists 
shelved metaethical considerations surrounding the theory of evolution.7 That is, until now. 
Advances in the fields of neuroscience and evolutionary biology have redirected our 
attention to an evolutionary explanation for the moral sentiments that we possess. Ethicists are 
 
5 See Weikart, 2013. 
6 See Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 1739: Book 3, Part 1, Section 1, Paragraph 27. 
7 See Ruse, 1986. 
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now specifically interested in what kind of relationship to moral laws the products of 
evolutionary forces (such as ourselves) could possibly have. Put another way, the nature of their 
questions has shifted from evaluating specific content within moral systems to investigating any 
moral system’s metaphysical and/or epistemic legitimacy. Faculties capable of moral judgement 
evolved, and all moral “facts” are known subjectively and exclusively through that evolved 
moral faculty. Therefore, if our capacity to pass moral (or, evaluative) judgements has been 
endowed to us by forces that favor survivability above all else, some ethicists conclude that the 
theory of evolution necessarily undermines any grounds for belief in moral realism. Moral 
realism, in a general sense, will mean that mind-independent, causally inert morals (whether 
natural or non-natural) exist, and that we can come to know at least some of these morals. The 
arguments sometimes are more metaphysical in nature, seeking to prove the implausibility of 
moral realism given the evolutionary history, but most focus on the epistemological 
consequence: that, regardless of the veracity of moral realism, it is difficult to explain how or 
why organisms would come to know mind-independent, causally inert moral properties. This is 
essentially the framework of the Evolutionary Debunking Argument (EDA), the topic of this 
thesis. That Darwin’s theory presents insurmountable problems for moral realists is a position 
still maintained by many philosophers today, it being the upshot of Evolutionary Debunking 
Arguments.  
Just as many people a century ago surmised, the theory of evolution may verily entail 
some ethical consequences, but with this insight elucidated by EDAs, its exhaustive implications 
could elicit a far more startling paradigm-shift than Darwin’s contemporaries ever imagined. If 
no moral faculty can be trusted to be ordered towards objective truth due to its evolutionary 
origins, then we would have to move forward with the understanding that no moral system can 
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be known to be objectively true, correct, or universally binding. Moreover, strong arguments 
have been brought forward equating morals epistemically with mathematics, as we’ll explore 
later in this paper. If EDAs necessitate a position of skepticism with regards to morals, it may 
equally entail a position of skepticism towards mathematics as well. With stakes as high as these, 
this subject warrants a careful investigation.  
Important also to stipulate from the outset is that the EDA I seek to discuss is the one that 
begins from the premise that evolution is “fitness-tracking,” as opposed to primarily “truth-
tracking.” Some such as Alvin Plantinga (a theistic moral non-naturalist) have argued that 
evolution could be “truth-tracking” because a divine design oriented our cognitive faculties to 
develop in a specific direction, i.e., towards knowing truth, so his EDA will not come under the 
same fire as the former one I mentioned.8 I seek to address the EDA that is most often wielded 
by strict materialists, those who promote that we were not guided along in our evolution by 
preternatural or supernatural forces but that all results of natural selection were contingent on 
preexisting natural circumstances. 
Here, then, will be the structure of this paper. First, I will trace the primary arguments 
proffered by Michael Ruse, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street, whose contributions to this 
discussion have constituted, arguably, the most seminal works in favor of EDAs to date. Next, 
before the moral realist even needs to mount a response from their own camp, there are a few 
chinks in the EDA’s armor that anyone, realist or not, can address before moving forward. This 
would be in properly understanding the epistemic limits of the EDA and demonstrating the 
EDA’s intrinsic epistemic incoherence. I will then point out several metaphysical presumptions 
Ruse, Joyce, and Street make along the way in their arguments that extend the discussion of 
 
8 See Plantinga, 1993.  
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EDAs’ limitations. The next section will explore how the evolutionary challenge for moral 
realism is equally an evolutionary challenge to mathematical realism as well as the relation’s 
significance to the Benacerraf-Field challenge. I’ll then briefly touch upon a few plausible 
tracking theories before closing the paper with my final thoughts and conclusions. 
 
2. THE HARBINGERS OF THE EDA 
2.1. MICHAEL RUSE 
 Michael Ruse posits what is a primarily metaphysical problem for moral realists both in 
the naturalist and non-naturalist camps. He argues that evolutionary selective pressures offer a 
complete and sufficient explanation for the rise of moral systems such that any attempt to 
objectify moral phenomena would be redundant and unnecessary. Furthermore, whatever moral 
systems we devise or adhere to must accord with our nature, which is not a characteristic of an 
independently true, objective moral code, unless we concede that humans are the only moral 
beings and something beyond evolutionary pressures guided our emergence from the primordial 
soup. Until we accept that, he writes, the existence of any moral laws and their value to us 
(especially those that contradict our nature) must come into question.  
 
2.1.1. “EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS: A PHOENIX ARISEN” (1986) 
 In his paper “Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen,” Ruse  explains that the modern 
evolutionist’s position is that all ethics are illusory.9 Evolutionists in Darwin’s era mistakenly 
 
9 See Ruse, 1986. 
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attempted to ground moral truth in the moral systems of our simian ancestors and those extant or 
more rudimentary analogues in the animal kingdom. The modern evolutionist denies that there 
exists any ground for moral truth, be it in the evolutionary origin story, theism, Platonism, non-
naturalism, or any other such system. Ethics is illusory, Ruse contends, in that though human 
morality is purely subjective and rooted in psychology, we still believe that it is objective. We 
believe moral statements are true and binding, and this is what gives them more power than, say, 
emotions, which we don’t believe to be objectively binding, he writes. Evolution produced 
humans and all their moral sentiments, despite whatever is believed about them. 
 Ruse answers the objection of why, if our system of ethics is not built upon truly 
objective moral facts, we are anything but selfish. He explains that there exists a sufficient 
biological basis for the evolution of altruism: kin selection and the expectation of reciprocal 
altruism. By kin selection, he means that there is a fitness advantage for genes that prefer giving 
special aid to close biological relatives over genes that regard family members with equal 
suspicion as strangers. Genes that are more inclined to aid family members equate to more of 
those genes, or its nearly identical offshoots, being propagated. Parents, for example, willing to 
take on the selfless task of years of child-rearing will propagate their genes far better than the 
parents who leave their helpless infants and children to fend for themselves, but they’ll also do 
this better than individuals who dole out that same intensive care indiscriminately to anyone, 
relative or not. By reciprocal altruism, he means a social system not unlike “an insurance 
policy,” wherein all contribute to the pool of good deeds and only make withdrawals when 
needed. This creates a moral obligation within the group to assist others; those who ignore this 
moral obligation will be punished or removed from the group. Thus, the social pressures of a 
group exercising reciprocal altruism give rise to an elementary moral system. Ruse candidly 
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admits that there isn’t a great biological explanation for the modern moral sentiment that humans 
have an equal duty to all other humans, however. He conjectures that our technology has 
outpaced our evolution. The example he gives is that now, thanks to the internet, global industry, 
and so forth, he knows that there are starving children in Africa, and he can send them money for 
food. He asks if his moral obligation to help these starving children overseas is equal to helping 
his own children. 
 Having traced a rough genealogy of moral systems and explained how they’ve shaped 
our attitudes today, Ruse addresses the much grander metaethical issues the theory of evolution 
poses for philosophers. He begins by briefly outlining what he calls the perspective analogy. The 
perspective analogy states that just as other organs have evolved to be sensitive to objective, 
independently real phenomena in their surroundings, so too has the moral sense evolved to detect 
objective, independently real moral laws. take an apple, for example. Even though the eyes are 
products of evolutionary forces and the image of an apple is subjectively experienced by the 
viewer, most would not doubt the veridical existence of the apple in the environment. Some 
people then equate this subjective apperception by organs of the real apple to the subjective 
apperception by the moral sense of real moral laws; this is the perspective analogy. 
 To investigate this, Ruse imagines the existence of two universes, one with objective 
morals and one without. For example, one universe has a God instructing us to care for the sick, 
in the other, God isn’t there or is indifferent to our attitude towards the sick. Either way, Ruse 
writes, humans would have evolved to naturally care for the sick; the principles of kin selection 
and reciprocal altruism give plenty of room for this biological predilection with or without 
objective ethics. He says that by this insight, an objective moral system would be “redundant.” 
The assertion that only in a universe with objective morals would humans evolve to care for the 
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sick carries the assumption that forces beyond evolutionary pressures, i.e., something 
preternatural, was directing our evolution, an opinion with which scientists can do nothing. 
Given the premise that only the forces of natural selection guided our evolution, then the 
problem for moral realists gets even worse. That means we didn’t evolve with these morals and 
customs because supra-scientific forces made it such that we had to; we are what we are, we 
have the morals that we have, by the contingencies of our circumstances. He gives the graphic 
example that, had we not evolved from primates in the savannah but from cave-dwelling 
termites, our system of ethics would more closely resemble that of the contingencies of a termite-
like existence, including highly regarding the practice of eating each other’s feces to ensure 
everyone has the necessary parasites for digestion as termites must to survive. Thus, he 
demonstrates that under the given premise, our ethics depend entirely on our biology. 
 Before closing his paper, Ruse addresses one famous philosophical effort of grounding 
objectivity in morals without appealing to anything external: Immanuel Kant’s constructivist 
theories. Kant argued that morality arises whenever rational beings interact and subsists in those 
interactions. Kant, like the evolutionary biologist, also argued that acting morally is not only 
reasonable, but it also has greater binding power than preference, as a society that cannot 
function socially will not be a society for long. Yet the constructivist argument still depends on 
the contingent nature of the rational beings. Biologists hesitate to agree entirely with Kantian 
constructivism because it implies that human-centric morality is the superlative moral system for 
any rational creature. He briefly returns to the rational termite-humans to demonstrate that they 
could not perfectly adhere to human-centric morality as their biology necessitates engaging in 
behaviors that we would call repugnant or even hazardous. If there would be a dispensation to 
engage in those behaviors to avoid suicide, then the constructivist must concede that morality 
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must mold itself to some degree according to the rational being’s nature. Thus, Ruse concludes, 
there is no separating human nature from morality, as the former determines the latter.  
 
2.2. RICHARD JOYCE 
Richard Joyce carves out a path for moral fictionalism. He contends that, regardless of 
whether moral properties exist or not, there is an impossibly wide gap between those truths and 
our ability to ever know them, given our fitness-focused evolutionary history. Essentially, he 
argues that we can never have epistemic certainty that our moral beliefs are justifiable. There is 
still yet a utility in forming certain moral beliefs over others, though, so first-order moralizing 
need not be halted. 
 
2.2.1. THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY (2006) 
 In Chapter Six, “The Evolutionary Debunking of Morality,” of his book The Evolution of 
Morality, Joyce presents his seminal analogy of belief pills to expose the epistemological threat 
the evolutionary origin story poses to moral realists.10 To begin, he imagines a world wherein 
taking a certain pill confers a certain belief. One pill will make you believe Napoleon Bonaparte 
won the Battle of Waterloo in 1814, and the other will make you believe he didn’t, and that upon 
taking either one, you will forget that you took any pill and that such pills exist. Joyce imagines 
you took the pill that made you believe Napoleon lost that battle, you forget you took it, and you 
carry on living your life believing Napoleon lost (as he did). Say a cure to the amnesic effects of 
the pills hits the market, and you suddenly remember that you took the Napoleon-loses pill. 
 
10 See Joyce, 2006: Chapter 6. 
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Because you formed your belief of Napoleon’s failure in 1814 from a blind process (as opposed 
to, say, studying the history), the veracity of the content of your belief must come into question. 
Until you acquired the requisite historical evidence to know that the content of that belief is 
correct, your belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo is unjustified, as this belief was acquired in a 
way that had no connection to the content itself but was randomly selected. In entirely the same 
way, Joyce contends, because our moral beliefs are the products of a blind and random 
evolutionary process, our moral beliefs are unjustified. 
 Drawing explicitly from an earlier argument by Gilbert Harman,11 Joyce poses an 
epistemological problem for moral realists. Because the forces of evolution have up until now 
shaped all our moral beliefs, we must investigate the content of all our moral beliefs, and not just 
whether we’ve made the right call on specific issues (euthanasia good, abortion bad, for 
example), but whether any moral right or wrong can be known to exist and, more importantly, 
known by us. Essentially, even if mind-independent moral truths existed, he contends that 
because we evolved by a fitness-focused process, we cannot ever hope to have true, indubitable 
knowledge of those truths. He argues that not only is the pill scenario a fair analogy, but that it 
continues to hold today.  
 Joyce argues that the moral conundrum is unique. The fact that evolutionary pressures 
shaped our mathematic sense, for instance, does not similarly undermine our mathematical 
beliefs. He gives the example of two people on the savannah.12 There would have been a fitness 
advantage conferred to individuals who believed that 1 lion + 1 lion = 2 lions as opposed to 
individuals who believed 1 lion + 1 lion = 0 lions, as the one without the capacity for basic 
arithmetic would have been eaten. Evolutionary pressures would have selected for that 
 
11 See Harman, 1977: Chapter 1. 
12 This discussion of his will be referred to several times later in this paper. It takes place on pp. 182-190. 
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rudimentary mathematical capacity only if it corresponded to veridical, external, mathematical 
realities. The known universe cannot be conceived such that the mathematical belief 1 + 1 = 2 is 
false. Joyce explains that the same cannot be said of moral beliefs. He writes that undoubtedly, 
forming conclusions about rightness and wrongness on the savannah would’ve conferred greater 
fitness advantages for the survival of a social group than a group of individuals operating 
selfishly and entirely independent of others’ needs; importantly, however, he says that those 
primitive beliefs about goodness and badness could conceivably be formed without appealing to 
external, immutable principles of goodness and badness. Unlike mathematics, wherein the fitness 
advantage in believing 1 + 1 = 2 only makes sense if it is externally true, whether external moral 
properties existed in the time of our primitive ancestors has no bearing on the evolutionary 
genealogy of morality. That is to say, social creatures such as ourselves would’ve either had to 
appeal to external moral truths or make them up in order to survive. 
 Joyce also counters that the evolutionary debunking of morality does not therefore 
debunk all human reasoning. The capacity for arithmetic, as well as any other faculties we use in 
pursuit of science, only have an intelligible evolutionary genealogy if these faculties to some 
extent made correct judgements about phenomena in the surrounding environment. Morality is 
yet different, in that there would have been a necessity to formulate rules of behavior to facilitate 
social cooperation and survival of the group regardless of whether there existed any external 
moral truths to detect and by such things so correct these primitive normative moral systems. 
 Whereas Ruse thinks appealing to the existence of real moral properties is a redundant 
explanation to the evolutionary origin story, easily excised by Occam’s Razor, Joyce creates 
room for the nuance that there is a possibility that moral facts, if they can be reduced to non-
moral facts, could have a role to play in the evolutionary moral story. However, he is not 
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optimistic that the caliber of naturalistic reduction that global naturalists would need to see for 
the existence of moral facts will come about anytime soon. Joyce contends that until the moral 
naturalist can provide a seriously plausible reductive account of moral facts, a prospect he finds 
unlikely, the evolutionary origin of our moral beliefs will continue to undermine all justification 
for those beliefs. He encourages others to not hold their breath for moral realists to meet this 
challenge.  
 Joyce notes that if moral facts can be reduced even to simply preexisting items requisite 
for the evolutionary explanation of morality, then the premise that evolution undermines all 
content of moral beliefs fails. Joyce spends the remainder of the chapter demonstrating the 
challenge of establishing moral naturalism. A system of moral naturalism, Joyce argues, 
necessarily carries with it a practical clout, meaning that it is both inescapable and carries an 
indelible authority. He then subdivides moral naturalists into two camps: one that claims 
practical clout can be explained naturalistically, and one that denies the necessity of practical 
clout in a moral framework. Either way, Joyce concludes, the naturalists’ arguments are shaky at 
best and indefensible at worst. 
 The former group often mistakes finding a reason to perform or forebear against an action 
as finding practical clout in the natural world. The former group, too, will often equate morality 
to another property, such as happiness, claiming that whatever is moral is whatever maximizes 
happiness, as the utilitarians do. Other times they’ll merely assert that morality is whatever a 
person has a genuine reason to do, claiming that this is the naturalization of morality so long as 
the reason is brought about by whatever is defined as proper consideration and decision-making. 
This is the idea behind “practical reasoning theory,” that one can know if an act is wrong such 
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that if the agent were to correctly apply their reason, they would forebear from that act.13 He 
raises the issue of reasoning often being slanted by an individual’s idiosyncratic desires. 
Furthermore, if ever there was room to ask why one’s reason elicited a given conclusion to do X, 
it tacitly admits that some people’s reasoning is epistemically superior to others, and conclusions 
based on proper reasoning still retain room for debate, undermining practical reasoning theory, 
Joyce argues. The most prominent attempts have come from “self-conception strategies.”14 Joyce 
essentially finds these to be little more than games of semantics; simply declaring that behaving 
immorally damages one’s human identity or robs an individual of certain degree of autonomy 
carries no authoritative weight, he explains. If anything, self-conception strategies are exercises 
in emotional rhetoric that bring little to nothing to the table of establish moral naturalism. 
 Joyce concludes that moral naturalists are in trouble if it is accepted that any moral 
system is incoherent if it does not carry that practical clout of undeniable authority and 
inescapability, as even the naturalists who argue moral proscripts are the fruits of reason fall 
short of providing true practical clout. He sees the only alternatives to be either still yet 
jettisoning the requirement for a moral system to intrinsically carry practical clout (rendering 
ourselves, effectively, non-cognitivists), or to turn to the non-naturalists for an account of real 
moral properties. He illustrates that moral judgements can then therefore be explained by a non-
moral genealogy (evolution by natural selection), non-natural moral facts, and/or supernatural 
moral facts, and a quick slash from Occam’s Razor leaves us with the first proposition alone. 
Joyce ends the discussion with a concession that though knowing a truth-independent process 
shaped the content of our moral beliefs, those judgements are rendered unjustified, that doesn’t 
mean all those beliefs are untrue. Returning to the pill analogy at the beginning of the chapter, if 
 
13 See Harman, 1986. 
14 See Copp, 2004. 
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you learn that your belief in the fact that Napoleon lost Waterloo was imparted to you by having 
randomly taken one of two belief pills, a process that in no way relates to verifying its veracity, 
your belief would be rendered unjustified if still yet true. Joyce thinks the evolutionary 




2.3. SHARON STREET 
Sharon Street is responsible for articulating what she calls the Darwinian Dilemma. In 
this section, I will review the major arguments from both “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist 
Theories of Value” and “Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism 
Worth Worrying About” as both papers are often referenced by those responding to her. Like 
Ruse, she puts forth a primarily metaphysical challenge to all types of moral realism. 
 
2.3.1. “A DARWINIAN DILEMMA FOR REALIST THEORIES OF VALUE” (2006) 
 In this paper, Street begins with the following correction: our primitive ancestors did not 
first develop the capacity to form evaluative (i.e., moral) judgements, then exercise that faculty 
to decide which behaviors to engage in, which to forebear against; first, inarticulable, vague 
motivations and tendencies would’ve appeared, and those which would’ve been possible to 
inherit and provided a fitness advantage equal to or greater than the status quo would’ve 
survived.15 By the time the capacity for language and sophisticated cogitation came to the scene, 
 
15 See Street, 2006. 
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basic behaviors such as caring for the helpless young, helping members of your group, etc., that 
promoted survival would have already been selected for to some extent in the population. 
Consequently, the exact content of our evaluative judgements only shares, at best, an indirect 
relationship to the influences of natural selection. By this she means while natural selection 
didn’t necessarily bequeath judgements as exacting as “euthanasia is good, federal death 
sentences are bad,” for instance, it would’ve imparted to our ancestors more basic tendencies, as 
she calls them, like those mentioned earlier: helping the young and sick, trusting those who trust 
you, and so forth. 
 The crux of the Darwinian Dilemma is that moral realists must either claim a relation 
exists between the selective pressures that shaped our moral beliefs and the mind-independent 
moral facts that they posit exist (and describe the nature of such a relation), or they must deny 
any such relation exists at all. 
 If there is no link between the forces of natural selection that shaped our basic moral 
beliefs and evaluative truths, then the moral realist in this instance must concede that natural 
selection is an off-track process. In this case, we’d likely only ever arrive at the evaluative truths 
that by sheer coincidence also enhance our fitness, if any such exist, and more than likely 
overlook evaluative truths that don’t carry an intrinsic fitness advantage. Some continue to argue 
that despite no inherent link existing between the forces of natural selection and these moral 
facts, being creatures of reason, we can reflect and analyze our actions. We are not unthinking 
machines, the retort goes. The problem with this line of thinking, Street answers, is that we’d be 
making evaluative judgements based on previously established evaluative judgements or from 
some frame-of-reference moral system that was built by an off-track process. Essentially, we’d 
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be trying to correct error from more error. Either way, most of our evaluative judgements, if not 
all of them, would most likely be false. 
 The other option for the moral realist is to assert that some relation exists between 
evolutionary pressures and evaluative truths. Street posits that this route is the more plausible, as 
people already believe their evaluative judgements are true, and it is more likely that if we have 
true evaluative judgements, we did not arrive at them by mere chance.  
 Many moral realists will assert that the relation is obvious: evolutionary pressures 
selected for an improving ability to track evaluative truths. Street calls this the tracking account. 
These moral realists argue that it would’ve been advantageous for our primitive ancestors to 
accurately track these moral truths and to think and behave in light of them. Taking care of 
children is good, helping the sick is good, and those ancestors who grasped truths such as these 
better would’ve had a fitness advantage over others who couldn’t grasp these truths as well. She 
notes that the tracking account presents itself as a scientific explanation for the evaluative 
judgements we possess, but this is not to the tracking account’s advantage. Street presents an 
alternate scientific explanation that she calls the adaptive link account. By this account, primitive 
ancestors that clung to the evaluative judgements that tended to promote reproduction or enhance 
survivability are the ones that survived. She equates this development to some extent to the 
development of other fitness-promoting reflexes. Though contemplation plays a role in the 
formation of evaluative judgements, like reflexes, evaluative judgements arose because they 
allowed the organism to respond to the environment in a way that betters its chances of survival. 
 To illustrate the differences between the tracking account and the adaptive link account, 
she explains the origin of widespread evaluative judgements (preforming an action that will help 
keep the organism alive, helping kin, etc.) from the perspective of both. They both explain that 
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these judgements came about because holding to them would have benefited the survivability of 
the individual in question to some degree. The tracking account explains that the reason for this 
is because these evaluative judgements are true, while the adaptive link account recognizes that 
such behaviors would’ve naturally enhanced survivability regardless of such judgements being 
labeled true or false.  
 Street advocates that the adaptive link account is far superior to the tracking account on 
three grounds: its parsimony, its clarity, and its explanatory power. As for its greater parsimony, 
the tracking account necessitates adding elements to the world, mind- and desire-independent 
evaluative truths, to provide a complete explanation, whereas the adaptive link account does not. 
As for its clarity, Street notes that simply apprehending something true isn’t necessarily 
advantageous for one’s survival. For example, while we can afford to expend energy and 
resources to development and maintain equipment that can detect electromagnetic waves, other 
species cannot, and so to apprehend the truth about electromagnetic waves not only wouldn’t 
confer an evolutionary edge to these other species, it would actually be disadvantageous to 
attempt to apprehend the truth of these waves. Furthermore, if morality is real but non-natural as 
some claim,16 such truths can’t block a creature’s path or provide sustenance, can’t be pointed to; 
how learning about such intangible truths could provide a direct evolutionary advantage, Street 
cannot see. The moral naturalist is not in a much stronger position, she posits. Even if there is a 
reproductive advantage for perceiving evaluative facts, Street criticizes the vagueness of the 
nature of such facts, how they reduce or irreducibly overlay onto reality, and explains that the 
realist still cannot explain why the apperception of such facts would have directly enhanced 
survival. The word she uses for such a complex theory is “unattractive,” because the adaptive-
 
16 See Shafer-Landau, 2003. 
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link can provide a self-contained and comprehensible explanation without appealing to such 
vagaries.17 
 Her final point is that the adaptive link account sheds greater light on the question at 
hand, why most people make the same, certain evaluative judgements over others, than the 
tracking account. The adaptive link account satisfactorily explains why we value our survival, 
why we care for our offspring, why we value human lives over plants’ and animals’ lives, and so 
on, and that is because such tendencies promoted the reproductive success of our ancestors. The 
tracking account merely explains that we hold these judgements because survival is good, caring 
for the young is good, it’s right that we value fellow humans over other creatures, and the like. 
This doesn’t offer real explanatory power, as it fails to explain why these judgements are good 
and correct. It just says they are.  
 Street also points out that the tracking account fails on three fronts. It cannot explain the 
remarkable coincidence that so many of what the realists posit to be evaluative truths coincide 
with the beliefs we would have formed if those beliefs had only been chosen for their fitness 
advantage alone. It also cannot explain why we also tend to make evaluative judgements that, 
after consideration, we may think are false, and yet have held very deeply, for example, drawing 
a discriminatory line between the “in-group” and an “out-group.” The adaptive link account 
explains that this tendency arose because it tended to promote survival, while the tracking theory 
cannot give us a satisfactory answer as to why we tended to make false evaluative judgements 
(as most would agree that discriminating against people outside your group is wrong). Lastly, 
Street notes, only the adaptive link account can explain why judgements like “pufferfish are 
more important than people,” “we should scream at purple objects,” and other seemingly absurd 
 
17 See Street, 2006: p. 131. 
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statements have no place in our moral landscape: to hold such judgements would not have 
promoted survival. The realist could only insist that we don’t hold these and any other absurd 
judgements one could dream up simply because they’re false, which would not only be 
redundant but unhelpful in providing an explanatory account for making such judgements.  
Street concludes that the realist is left with two options at this point: he must either still 
accept the tracking theory despite the objections raised here, or that no relation exists, neither of 
which Street can assent to. She asserts that the only logical position in light of our evolutionary 
origin story is that of the moral antirealist. 
 
2.3.2. “REPLY TO COPP: NATURALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND THE VARIETIES 
OF REALISM WORTH WORRYING ABOUT” (2006) 
In her paper, “Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism 
Worth Worrying About,” after briefly recapitulating the arguments from the former paper, Street 
addresses the shortcomings of David Copp’s quasi-tracking thesis, the notion that evolutionary 
forces bequeathed us with the ability to track moral facts to an epistemically sufficient degree.18 
While Street continues to argue that the tracking account is unscientific, there is nothing 
intrinsically unscientific about this tracking thesis. It is problematic, however, as it still cannot 
explain why a relation between evolutionary pressures and independent moral truths exists in the 
first place. An internalist reading of Copp fails to elicit a satisfactory explanation as to why 
evolutionary pressures would have favored tracking independent truth facts; an externalist 
reading, that is, that we have no obligation to adhere to the dictates of morality, only explains the 
 
18 See Street, 2008; Copp, 2008: pp. 194-196. 
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moral facts without equipping them with any authoritative power over us, and such moral 
realism is not the target of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.  
Before closing this paper, she gives an outline of the requirements of a naturalist account 
of morality such that it adheres to uncompromising normative realism: (1) the natural-normative 
identity is correct regardless of personal evaluative attitudes, (2) it cannot be fixed by actual 
attitudes, and (3) it must be a version of moral internalism, i.e., it must carry a binding power to 
behave morally. If it does not meet all three of these requirements, Street continues, normative 
realism cannot be said to vindicate morality. Street is inclined to believe that no one holds a 
naturalist realism that satisfies all three of the above requirements. The turn would then be to 
non-naturalism, but the Darwinian Dilemma poses a problem for non-naturalist realism, as 
well.19 Ultimately, Street maintains the position that the Darwinian Dilemma demonstrates that 
all moral injunctions, all value to be found in the world, only exist because we’ve decided they 
do. 
 
3. LIMITATIONS OF THE EDA 
3.1. GUY KAHANE’S STRUCTURE FOR THE EDA 
Ruse, Joyce, and Street maintain that moral realism is redundant given the evolutionary 
origin story, inferior to antirealist explanations for the reason we possess the evaluative 
judgements that we do, and untenable given the fitness-first focus of natural selection. Neither 
moral naturalism nor moral non-naturalism seem safe from its blows. The argument they’ve set 
 
19 For more on how this challenge equally threatens non-natural moral realism, see Section 4.2. 
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up is now known as the Evolutionary Debunking Argument. How should the moral realist 
proceed? 
Before progressing, the final structure of the EDA needs to be clearly stipulated.20 In his 
paper, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” Guy Kahane does just that. First, he outlines the 
following structure for a General Debunking Argument: 
Causal premise. S’s belief that p is explained by X. 
 Epistemic premise. X is an off-track process. 
 Therefore 
 S’s belief that p is unjustified.21  
The structure of the EDA, then, is as follows: 
 Causal premise. S’s belief that p can be explained by our evolutionary history. 
Epistemic premise. Evolution is a not a truth-tracking process with respect to evaluative truths. 
 Therefore 
 S is not justified in believing p.22  
 
The scope of debunking arguments is limited to undermining the reason for believing p, but it 
can’t go so far as to definitively say that p is false. Specifically, it won’t show that having an 
evaluative attitude is unjustified, only that believing an evaluative attitude is justified is itself 
unjustified. Here, then, is the epistemic outer limit of the EDA: it cannot be used to undermine 
moral realism in a metaphysical sense, or, in other words, to disprove the existence of and/or 
influence of real moral properties on the formation of our moral beliefs, but it has the potential to 
dismantle our justifications for the moral beliefs we have formed thus far.   
 
 
20 The evolutionary debunking argument has many variations, each with specific wording that may entail or exclude 
certain conclusions from one another. I picked Kahane’s because his clearly demonstrates the scope of the argument 
in terms of its local vs. global debunking power, which is necessary to understand to the point of epistemic 
incoherency. 
21 See Kahane, 2011: p. 106. 
22 Ibid, p. 111. 




The question must immediately be raised as to whether the EDA as construed is self-
defeating. If the crux of the argument is that evolutionary influences, which aren’t truth-tracking 
with respect to evaluative truth due to evolution’s fitness-first focus, being responsible for the 
moral beliefs we have formed, render moral beliefs unjustified, why should it be the case that 
evolutionary influences are trusted to be truth-tracking for any other form of judgement, 
including scientific, mathematic, sensorial, and philosophical, such as those judgements which 
lead us to believe in the veracity of the EDA’s conclusion, when not truth but survival is still its 
primary aim? If the debunking power of the EDA can undermine epistemic certainty in 
evaluative judgements, it should therefore cause us to bring into question epistemic certainty for 
all types of judgements, unless proponents of the EDA are prepared to say that moral judgements 
are uniquely obfuscated by evolutionary influences.23  
Kahane, I think, correctly decides that are only three possible outcomes when wielding an 
EDA. The first option is to say that EDAs undermine no evaluative beliefs at all, and the second 
is that EDAs undermine all evaluative beliefs. This is because the question of internal coherency 
must be raised with respect to the epistemic premise. The final option is that only some 
evaluative beliefs are undermined by EDAs, which most of its proponents (including Ruse, 
Joyce, and Street) assume or argue. This final option, however, is the most chimerical. Kahane 
isn’t convinced that the epistemic premise can be stopped before leading to global skepticism. In 
fact, he concludes that local EDAs have no place in serious debates concerning normative ethics. 
 
23 This would not make much sense, of course, as all judgements are so far understood to be produced by the brain, 
itself a product of billions of years of evolutionary pressures and influences. If moral judgements are uniquely 
obfuscated by such pressures, then they must be the only beliefs formed by the brain (and our beliefs about 
everything else, including science, math, history, and so forth, by some immaterial rational faculty immune to 
evolutionary pressures), a conclusion with which I don’t imagine any proponent of the EDA would agree. 
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Driving this point home, a recent paper by Christophe de Ray explains how a scientific realist 
must then concede that his justification for believing in the veracity of the theory of evolution is 
unjustified, given the theory of evolution: 
Recall,‘scientific realism’ here refers to the view that our best scientific theories accurately represent mind-
independent states of affairs. Now, insofar as evolutionary theory figures among our best scientific theories 
(which it surely does), it follows that scientific realists are compelled, by virtue of being scientific realists, 
to believe in evolutionary theory. But if [believing evolutionary theory ought to make us distrust our innate 
metaphysical intuitions] is true, this means that scientific realists, by virtue of being scientific realists, 
ought to distrust innate metaphysical intuitions—including, crucially, the innate metaphysical intuition that 
facts generally have explanations for their obtaining. …if being a scientific realist compels us to believe a 
theory such that, if we believe it, we ought to distrust our innate metaphysical intuitions, including those 
intuitions that one must rely on in order to believe scientific realism, then scientific realism is a self-
undermining position.24  
 
It seems to follow that if evolution is a fitness-tracking process rather than truth-tracking, this 
should cause consternation for all justifications rather than solely justifications for moral 
sentiments. The materialist is forced, then, if they say that the content of moral judgements 
cannot be trusted to be true with respect to moral truths due to the obfuscating influence of 
evolutionary pressures, to likewise say that the content of any other beliefs we form with respect 
to scientific truth, mathematical truth, historical truth, and so forth, must also come under 
scrutiny, given that they, too, were formed by an evolution-addled brain. If we cannot trust the 
conclusion that we should not murder the neighbor’s cat simply because such a belief was 
formed by the brain, then, too, should we doubt that we ever saw a real cat in the neighbor’s 
yard, as that belief was also formed by the brain: this is the ultimate implication of the EDA as 





24 See de Ray, 2020: pp. 10, 18. 
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3.3. EPISTEMIC INCOHERENCE 
The would-be debunkers, ultimately, believe that EDAs carry a threatening challenge to 
the moral realists because they make a distinction between moral and nonmoral belief content. In 
doing so, they actually ground their argument on epistemological concerns surrounding moral 
properties rather than any concerns arising from the evolutionary account. Das explains, 
“[Pertaining] to the debunking force of EDAs—specifically…their force derives primarily from 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of morality or the (im)possibility of moral truth, 
rather than from epistemological doubts associated with our evolutionary history.”25 At the heart 
of the matter is not an evolutionary challenge: if it were, it would be immediately self-defeating, 
as shown in the previous section.26 The issue, then, is something more fundamentally metaethical 
in nature. Before explicating the metaethical issue they’re descrying, the following subsection 
will expose the metaethical underpinnings of their Darwinian arguments. 
 
3.3.1. THE ROOT OF RUSE’S CLAIMS 
Ruse makes the rather hasty presumption that an objective moral system would provide a 
redundant explanation for the moral sentiments we possess. He writes: 
Imagine two worlds, identical except that one has an objective ethics (whatever that might mean) 
and one does not. Perhaps, in one world God wants us to look after the sick, and in the other He 
could not care less what we do. The evolutionist argues that, in both situations, we would have 
evolved in such a way as to think that, morally, we ought to care for the sick. To suppose otherwise, 
to suppose that only the world of objective ethics has us caring about the sick, is to suppose that 
there are extrascientific forces at work, directing and guiding the course of evolution. And this is a 
supposition which is an anathema to the modern biologist...27 
 
 
25 See Das, 2016: p. 419. 
26 See Section 3.2. 
27 See Ruse, 1986: p. 107. 
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Ruse presumes that a universe in which there are objective morals and a universe without such 
morals are otherwise identical. Given that we have a sample space of exactly one universe and 
that we are as of yet unsure to which category ours belongs, this is a precarious presumption to 
make. It could be the case that, if the universe we occupy does contain somehow within it, 
whether as natural or nonnatural entities, objective moral laws, then a universe without such 
laws, and perhaps too our moral beliefs, would appear vastly different. Ruse can’t unequivocally 
espouse that the process of natural selection would’ve been unaffected by this change when he 
himself admits that he doesn’t understand what moral laws are nor how they would affect us. His 
tone carries the same petulance as the callow physicist who proclaims, “I don’t know what string 
theory is, but given a universe wherein string theory is true and a universe wherein it is not, 
humans in those two universes would have evolved in the exact same manner regardless.”28 Erik 
J. Wielenberg assesses, “Assuming…that nihilism is false in the actual world and that the moral 
supervenes on the nonmoral, the nearest [world that Ruse describes here] is impossible.”29 If 
morals exist and are a natural phenomenon, then it would be contradictory to say that a world 
with and a world without a given natural phenomenon would be indistinguishable from one 
another, for one lacks some real natural thing that the other possesses. If morals are real but 
nonnatural, and if they in any way impress on the natural world, then that impression, whatever 
form that may take, would similarly make the world impressed by nonnatural morals 
distinguishable from the world that lacks nonnatural morals and those conspicuous 
 
28 This is not to fault him, of course, for not knowing what is meant by objective ethics nor what the properties of 
moral laws are. To point this out, as well, is not done under the presumption, either, that someone else or anyone 
knows exactly what moral laws are, given that they are still only propositions as far as is understood. I mean only to 
say that this is too bold a claim given his lack of understanding of objective ethics. 
29 See Wielenberg, 2010: p. 456. 
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impressions.30 Ruse’s position depends on the unwarranted belief that a universe lacking 
objective ethics is identical to the one that lacks them not, and this is an unwarranted belief 
because he does not know the nature of “objective ethics (whatever that might mean).”31 
 Ruse, of the three, is the most willing to contend with the possibility that the evolutionary 
origin story could undermine epistemic certainty across the board. In fact, he does admit in his 
book, Darwinism and its Discontents, that our beliefs are just as tenably formed in other regards 
as they are regarding morals: 
...the Darwinian assumes simply that the rules of mathematics and logic; the basic beliefs about 
causality and the like; the epistemic values or principles, are not simply cultural ephemera that were 
invented by people ... but are at some level ingrained in our biology….One thinks mathematically 
because one is biologically disposed to do so, and one is attracted to simple and elegant theories for the 
same reason. Why should this be so? [B]ecause those of our would-be ancestors who thought 
mathematically and logically and preferred the simple to the complex tended to survive and reproduce, 
and those that did not, did not.32 
 
Ramon Das provides another quote from Ruse to contrast with the above to demonstrate this 
discrepancy and commentary: 
[W]hen Ruse turns to ethics, he draws a very different conclusion: the Darwinian ethicist should "take 
a radically different approach and...deny that there are any foundations [to ethics] at all! The 
Darwinian's answer to the question of justification is that ethics—substantive ethics, that is—has no 
justification."33 
In short, in both cases—Darwinian epistemology and ethics alike—Ruse appears to concede to his 
anti-realist opponent that a robustly realist metaphysical position is implausible, given our evolutionary 
history. However, in the former case he thinks this is no big deal: metaphysical reality is nothing to us, 
and since we cannot use it, we should dismiss it. In the latter case, however, the impossibility of 
maintaining a robust realism is a big deal: ethics is not real! It has no foundation!34  
 
 
30 Sharon Street briefly discusses the difficulty in maintaining the position of a moral nonnatural realist in the first 
horn of her Darwinian Dilemma (Street, 2006: 121-125). This person has to deny that a relation exists between 
moral truths and the moral beliefs we’ve formed, claiming ultimately then that evolution by natural selection selects 
for moral beliefs independently from those truths, differing from the moral skeptics and antirealists in only that they 
additionally aver the existence of nonnatural moral laws. 
31 See the block quote from Ruse on Page 24. 
32 See Ruse, 2006: pp. 242-243. 
33 See Ruse, 2006: p. 255. 
34 See Das, 2016: p. 430. 
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Ramon Das points out that Ruse makes several metaphysical assumptions. First, he assumes 
there would be no difference in a world with and a world without morals. Secondly, he assumes 
that evolution is not progressive in relation to moral progress as it is (assumed to be) progressive 
in other domains, such as science and mathematics. Finally, he recognizes that though it’s 
possible that in some way, evolution may have selected for moral beliefs by “drawing [them]” in 
reference to something external, he does not care to explore this possibility, believing no 
reductive account for morals in the natural world can be made. Therefore, Das seems right to 
conclude that his arguments rest on shaky metaphysical foundations. 
 
3.3.2. RESPONDING TO JOYCE 
  Joyce balances his argument on top of several metaphysical presumptions about the 
nature of morality as well. He concludes:  
Harman’s challenge…is that hypothesis A [the nonmoral genealogical account from the theory of 
evolution] promises to explain all of our moral judgements, leaving us without need to posit any moral 
facts (i.e., with no reason to assume that any of our moral judgements are true) unless the moral facts 
are somehow implicitly buried in hypothesis A. The only way that moral facts could be implicitly 
buried in a scientific genealogical hypothesis is if some kind of moral naturalism were true…[but] the 
previous two sections have cast doubt on this possibility…[now] Ockham’s Razor really can come in 
and do its thing, for non-naturalism and supernaturalism do posit extra ontology in the world, but the 
presence of the non-moral genealogy (hypothesis A) shows this ontology to be explanatorily 
superfluous. Hypotheses B and C [non-naturalism and supernaturalism, respectively] can be excised.35 
 
This carries with it a version of the same presumption Ruse made, namely, presuming that 
human moral sentiments would have evolved in the exact same manner in both the presence and 
absence of moral facts, entities which remain inscrutable to the speaker. Given that Joyce is 
forced to explore various iterations of realist positions (naturalism, non-naturalism, 
supernaturalism, etc.), this presumption is, at root, nonsensical, because by even contending with 
competing versions of the realist position, it’s evident that he himself does not know what a 
 
35 See Joyce, 2006: pp. 209-210. 
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moral fact is and therefore cannot reasonably assert that moral facts have no noticeable effect on 
the evolutionary development of moral beliefs.  
Most critically, in my opinion, he makes a rather arbitrary distinction between the reason 
certain mathematical judgements are trustworthy and the reason moral judgements are not.36 It is 
by this distinction that Joyce asserts that we ought to only be skeptical about the content of our 
moral beliefs but not to the content of our other beliefs, such as those regarding science or 
mathematics. Anticipating this rebuttal, recall that Joyce attempts to draw a distinction between 
the domains of math, science, and morals37 but his distinction rests upon largely undefended 
metaphysical claims, as Ramon Das explains. Das writes: 
When it comes to reducing the moral to the non-moral, however, Joyce sets the bar considerably 
higher. Despite his claim that he is interested only in the broad sense of reduction, it is clear that when 
it comes to the moral case he thinks "having a story to tell" is not going to be enough for the moral 
naturalist to make her case. …It is in Joyce's assessment of this proposal that the key metaphysical 
claims behind his debunking argument against the moral naturalist come to the fore.  
These metaphysical claims are mainly two… the first is about the nature of moral values; the 
second, about the possibility of reducing such values to naturalistic facts. Specifically, the first claim 
holds that moral values are inescapably authoritative…. And Joyce's second metaphysical claim is 
simple: given the nature of moral values just articulated, there are no moral values. 
…Without the metaphysical claim that there are no moral values, there is a gap in the argument 
against the possibility of reducing the moral to the non-moral. And without the latter argument there is 
a gap in any epistemological debunking argument that tells against the moral naturalist. … the 
apparently epistemological character of EDAs obscures key metaphysical claims about the nature of 
morality or moral truth on which the debunkers' arguments crucially depend.38  
 
Responding to Joyce on the same point on epistemic incoherence, William FitzPatrick notes: 
At a formal level, we employ the same logical and analytic abilities in moral reasoning as in other forms of 
reasoning. And in terms of conceptual content, moral reflection and reasoning is continuous with broader 
evaluative and normative thinking that our cognitive capacities were plausibly designed to do accurately.39  
 
 
36 The ability to distinguish math and morality epistemically will be explored in great depth in Section 4. 
37 See Joyce, 2006: pp. 182-190. 
38 See Das, 2016: pp. 423-424. Emphasis his. 
39 See FitzPatrick, 2015: p. 888. 
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For Joyce to divide the faculties by which moral judgements are formed from the rest of the 
mind’s faculties40 is indefensible given this continuity. The argument for their epistemic 
dichotomy will be explicated in greater detail in later sections.41 For now, let it simply be noted 
that this is ultimately an untenable distinction and cannot be used to undermine justifications for 
moral beliefs without shaking the epistemic justifications for the whole swath of human beliefs.42 
 
3.3.3. STREET’S “A-DARWINIAN” DILEMMA 
Eleonora Severini and Fabio Sterpetti, addressing Street’s reluctance to embrace global 
antirealism as quickly as she embraces moral antirealism, write: 
In other words, Street embraces an EDA [evolutionary debunking argument] for morality and an EA 
[evolutionary argument] for other domains, e.g. scientific beliefs, common sense beliefs or beliefs based on 
perceptions. In so doing, Street’s position is epistemically incoherent. Indeed, it could be claimed that once 
we have accepted an evolutionary account of the epistemic justification of our beliefs, then it is epistemically 
incoherent to support antirealism in one domain and realism in other domains. The problem, critics say, is 
that if one goes evolutionary, it is difficult to contain ‘the corrosive acid’ of Darwinism to a specific set of 
beliefs…. In other words, if nothing can be justified because evolutionary influences prevent us from 
justifying any claim, then it is surely not only moral realism that is in trouble.43  
 
They show that Street wants to have her cake and eat it too: she thinks she can use the 
evolutionary origin story to say that all moral beliefs are unjustified, using scientific beliefs 
formed by the same brain formed by the same evolutionary pressures she now argues obfuscated 
her moral reasoning faculties. 
 Recall, too, that Street argues for an adaptive link account (ALA) over a tracking account 
(TA). A paper by Marc Artiga44 breaks down the weaknesses in her three reasons for doing so: 
parsimony, clarity, and explanatory power. 
 
40 Again, see Joyce, 2006: pp. 182-190 for his discussion on their separation. 
41 See Section 4. 
42 See Section 3.2. 
43 See Severini & Sterpetti, 2017: p. 8. 
44 See Artiga, 2015. 
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First, she argues that the ALA is more parsimonious than the TA because the TA 
“obviously posits something extra that the [ALA] does not, namely independent evaluative 
truths.”45 Like Ruse, she presumes that a universe without objective morals is indistinguishable 
from a universe with them. Unlike the previous debunkers, this point doesn’t only stand if the 
above statement is true. In her Darwinian Dilemma, it is presumed for the sake of argument that 
moral realism is true. Moral realism posits both that morals exist and that we can come to know 
the existence of at least some of them. Given, then, in this construction that moral realism is 
presumed true, the ALA does not posit anything ontologically superfluous, and thus, Occam’s 
Razor deems ALA and TA to have commensurate ontological volume and so can do no slashing. 
Furthermore, no additional evidence is being presented to the moral realist, essentially: it is 
rather obvious that one case presents the possibility of moral facts, and the other does not. Just 
because one is lacking in moral facts does not provide evidence that indeed, there are, more than 
likely, no moral facts, as Street suggests.46 Valuing ontological parsimony threatens to eviscerate 
the correct explanation. The ALA is only better/more parsimonious than TA if it is indeed the 
case that moral facts do not exist or had no influence over how moral beliefs were formed, which 
is not known. 
Secondly, she points out the difficulty in explaining how an organism could benefit from 
accurately representing causally inert, mind-independent moral facts. Essentially, her argument 
rests on the assumption that no one has yet provided a noteworthy explanation as to how moral 
facts can be figured into causal explanations. Given that this subject has a substantial body of 
literature surrounding it, it’s a large and unstable presumption, Artiga writes.47 Furthermore, this 
 
45 See Street, 2006: p. 129. 
46 See Artiga, 2015: pp. 3363-3364. 
47 See Artiga, 2015: p. 3366. 
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gives it a temporary dimension as well: as soon as a proper account surfaces, this point loses all 
force. 
The last point, the point of explanatory power, is what he considers her strongest. To 
address this, he points out, however, that the ALA and the TA need not come into conflict 
together. He makes this argument by citing teleosemenatics: 
Teleosemenatics claims that the existence of a representational mechanism requires a sender (which 
often enough must represent truly) and a receiver (which often enough must lead to fitness-enhancing 
behavior). Both the truth of the representation and the adaptiveness of the ensuing behavior explain 
why a representational mechanism exists at all. Thus, TA and [ALA] should not be considered 
alternative accounts, but complementary explanations.48  
 
This, of course, follows only if moral realism is actually true, but it could take part in a fuller 
response from a moral realist such that Street’s point of explanatory power falls flat. This 
rebuttal will address Street’s other objections to the TA, such as why the TA forms suspiciously 
remarkable coincidences between truths and reproductive advantage, why we do not hold all 
possible moral judgements, and why we make (presumedly) false judgements on occasion, such 
as prioritizing the well-being of only in-group members. 
Recall that Street assumes moral realism to be true for the sake of her argument. 
Importantly, however, moral realism, as she understands it, has two premises: the first is that 
moral laws exist, and that at least some of those laws are knowable. Therefore, Klenk points out 
that at the very least, “[t]his would be enough to reject the claim that empirical evidence about 
the origins of our beliefs gives us sufficient reason to doubt the truth of all of our moral 
beliefs.”49 However, the crucial thing is that Street’s argument rests upon the force of the 
Benacerraf-Field Challenge and not really a Darwinian dilemma. In brief, the Benacerraf-Field 
Challenge questions our ability to ever obtain proper knowledge of mind-independent, causally 
 
48 Ibid, p. 3370.  
49 See Klenk, 2017: p. 785. 
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inert properties.50 As shown earlier, when EDAs revolve around an empirical premise, the 
argument immediately becomes self-defeating.51 Therefore, a robust evolutionary argument 
against moral realism fails.52 However, Street’s arguments retain veritable power against moral 
realism in that it ultimately relies on the more stable Benacerraf-Field challenge, with “the 
reference to empirical, Darwinian considerations…reduced to an illustrative veneer that is 
ultimately redundant to reaching the argument’s conclusion.”53  
 
3.3. THEN THE PROBLEM ISN’T DARWINIAN 
Kahane warns, “If you cite an off track causal influence on an interlocutor’s belief that p 
in order to increase support for your view that not-p, you should, at the minimum, first rule out 
that your own belief was shaped by this or a similar influence.”54 The moment the evolutionary 
history is cited as a reason to distrust the content of our moral beliefs, immediately the content of 
all beliefs must come under scrutiny. This would also include the content of beliefs about first-
order logic, including those which buttress the epistemic premise of the EDA. Therefore, if 
evolution is as distorting as is purported, then EDAs are self-defeating. It can therefore be 
reasoned that, because EDAs are self-defeating, they pose no true threat to moral realism.55  
This is not to say that moral realism is in the clear, so to speak. Formidable charges have 
been levied against the position of moral realism that still need addressing from an evolutionary 
perspective. Specifically, the question becomes twofold. First, how could we come to know the 
 
50 The Benacerraf-Field Challenge will be expounded upon in greater detail in Section 4.2. 
51 See Section 3.2. 
52 See Klenk, 2017: p. 794. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Kahane, 2011: p. 113. 
55 Again, this applies to the EDA directed towards materialists. This may not be the case for an EDA constructed by 
a theistic moral non-naturalist. 
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existence of mind-independent, causally inert entities like moral properties? Secondly, why 
should we think evolutionary pressures selected for accurate mental representation of these 
properties?  
 
4. MATH AND MORALS: EPISTEMIC EQUIVALENTS? 
Before exploring the question of whether or not we can ever have proper knowledge of 
mind-independent, causally inert properties like morals, let us also consider another set of 
(arguably, proposed) abstract entities which this definition includes: mathematics. What will 
follow is an argument delineated by Justin Clarke-Doane for the epistemic implications for 
mathematics when challenging moral knowledge on evolutionary grounds. 
 
4.1 JUSTIN CLARKE-DOANE 
Justin Clarke-Doane will show that the traditional (i.e., axiomatic) system of mathematics 
is epistemically equivalent to any axiomatic system of morality and therefore subject to a 
tantamount Darwinian debunking. He later tries to rescue moral realism specifically from these 
consternations, especially with respect to the Benacerraf-Field Challenge, but, I’ll argue, is not 
successful. If anything, by drawing attention to these epistemic relations, he helps dig a deeper 
hole for moral realists. 
 
4.1.1. “MORALITY AND MATHEMATICS: THE EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGE” 
(2012) 
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In his paper, “Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge,” Clarke-Doane 
puts forth the argument that one cannot simultaneously hold the position of mathematical realism 
and moral antirealism.56 First, he clarifies the target of the evolutionary challenge to moral 
realism or the evolutionary challenge to mathematical realism. It is “the view that there is a 
mind-language-independent array of truths of the relevant sort to which our corresponding 
discourse answers when interpreted literally.”57 Specifically, when discussing topic D, D-realism 
is the conjunction of four schemata.  
 
[D-TRUTH-APTNESS]: Typical D-sentences are truth-apt.58  
 
When D means morality, this blocks A. J. Ayer’s emotivism, the position that ethical statements 
are mere expressions of feelings toward given behaviors. When D refers to mathematics, this 
blocks David Hilbert’s formalism which states that nonfinitary mathematical propositions are 
used to make moves in a game. 
 
[D-TRUTH]: Some atomic or existentially quantified D-sentences are true.59  
 
This excludes J. L. Mackie’s error theory for morality and Hartry Field’s fictionalism for 
mathematics. Both theories purport that the subject matter of their discourse (objective moral 
laws and abstract mathematical objects, respectively) does not exist, so all statements made 
about them are ultimately false.  
 




56 See Clarke-Doane, 2012. 
57 Ibid, p. 315. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, p. 316. 
60 Ibid. 
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This schema blocks Christine Korsgaard’s constructivism when taken to mean that morals are 
constituted by the reasoning of rational agents, and it blocks L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuitionalism 
when taken to mean mathematical truths depend on the ability of the mind to derive its truth.  
 
[D-LITERALNESS]: D-sentences should be interpreted literally.61  
 
 
This schema disallows for reinterpretations of D-discourse to be true. In the case of morality, this 
blocks Harman’s relativism such which has for a given moral sentence s, according to a moral 
framework M, s.62 It also blocks any mathematical theories in which mathematical discourse is, 
as a whole, misleading.63 Clarke-Doane explains that this grounds D-sentences in a position of 
neutrality; D-sentences are not conditional upon the framework or theory from which D-
discourse emanates. The conjunction of these four schemas is D-realism, and its proponents D-
realists. When D refers to morality, the conjunction is moral realism, the target of the 
evolutionary debunking argument for moral realism. Similarly, when D refers to mathematics, 
the conjunction is mathematical realism, the target of the evolutionary challenge for 
mathematical realism. He also defines evolutionary explanations versus trivial explanations. 
Evolutionary explanations are those which explain our having many true D-beliefs because 
natural selection favored those who had true D-beliefs. Trivial explanations are those which 
explain our having many true D-beliefs by the hypothesis that it is inconceivable to imagine the 
D-truths being any different.  
 Targets now clearly elucidated, Clarke-Doane recapitulates the two driving points of the 
evolutionary debunking arguments. The first is that our moral beliefs and/or the cognitive 
faculties responsible for the formation of those beliefs are products of an evolutionary process. 
 
61 Ibid, p. 317. 
62 Paraphrasing from Harman & Thompson, 1996. 
63 See Chihara, 1990; Hellman, 1989. 
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More generally, “we were selected to have cognitive mechanisms that entail dispositions to form 
certain primitive belief-like representations in certain environments.”64 The second is that given 
that evolution is a non-truth-tracking process with respect to moral beliefs, we were not selected 
to form true moral beliefs or have the cognitive faculties capable of reliably forming belief-like 
representations of the state of moral affairs. Nodding back to Street’s Darwinian Dilemma, the 
resulting conundrum for moral realists is in explaining how a “non-truth-tracking” process could 
give rise to us having formed so many true moral beliefs (as most moral realists would assert that 
we have) without citing an astronomical coincidence. 
 It establishes two things. First, the moral realist may not rely upon the explanation that 
we were selected to have true moral beliefs (or cognitive capacities to form reliable 
representations of moral phenomena). We may have been selected to have some moral 
beliefs/cognitive dispositions inclining us towards certain representations, but not that such 
beliefs and representations were necessarily true. The second upshot is that the moral realist 
cannot explain our having many true beliefs by citing the impossibility of imagining vastly 
different moral truths as true.  
 A difference is often delineated between the importance of forming true mathematical 
beliefs for survival and the importance of forming useful (but not necessarily true) moral beliefs 
for survival.65 By this, it is meant that had the moral truths been entirely different, our moral 
beliefs would’ve been the same, as the moral beliefs selected for were those that best promoted 
survival. The same cannot be said, it is argued, for mathematical beliefs. For example, if a moral 
truth stipulated that killing offspring was good, Clarke-Doane writes, humans would have still 
evolved to believe that killing offspring was bad, as those who did were more likely to have 
 
64 See Clarke-Doane, 2012: p. 318. 
65 Again, see Joyce, 2006: pp. 182-190; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007. 
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surviving progeny to propagate the genes that engender that moral predisposition. Essentially, we 
can conceive of moral truths being entirely different and still presume that we would have 
evolved to form the beliefs we have now. In the case of math, though––it is nearly inconceivable 
to imagine 1+1 equaling anything but 2, but for the sake of argument––if mathematical truths 
were such that 1+1 truly equaled 0, the survival of our ancestors would have largely depended on 
their capacity to recognize and apply that truth in their environment.  
Joyce is among the ranks of those who explicitly hold this position, as may be recalled 
from earlier in this paper. Joyce is the one who makes the analogy to the ancestors on the 
savannah learning the life-and-death consequences of correctly mathematically accounting for 
the total number of lions in their surroundings.66 However, his analogy does not prove what he 
intends, Clarke-Doane explains. Rather than demonstrate the unique necessity of forming true 
mathematical beliefs, his example demonstrates that in order to provide an evolutionary 
explanation for the contents of our mathematical beliefs, we must presuppose those contents. 
Taken further, it appears that we must, in the pursuit of evolutionary explanations for the content 
of D-beliefs, assume the contents of those D-beliefs despite not being selected to form true D-
beliefs to arrive at that explanation. Clarke-Doane points out that we must presume the contents 
of our beliefs concerning elementary logic, for example, when deriving an evolutionary 
explanation for those elementary logic beliefs.  
He goes on to explain that for every mathematical belief H we are selected to possess, 
there is a corresponding, nonmathematical truth which makes the advantage for believing H 
plausible. He clarifies that a nonmathematical truth means a truth that doesn’t imply a 
substantive mathematical sentence as understood by the previously stipulated schemas. 
 
66 Again, see Joyce, 2006: pp. 182-190. 
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Whenever H corresponds to a basic arithmetic belief (such as 1 + 1 = 2), the relevant 
nonmathematical truth is often a first-order logical truth corresponding to elements in the 
environment. When H corresponds to a geometrical proposition, however, its relevant truths will 
be a little more complicated but yet still concern the nature of the environment. Here, Clarke-
Doane discusses as an example the geometrical proposition that the shortest distance between 
two points is a straight line, SD. He writes: 
What matters, as in the case of elementary arithmetic, is how such creatures’ mathematical beliefs 
“line up with” truths about their environments. If the physical world appropriately aligns with their 
mathematical beliefs, it does not matter whether the mathematical world does too. If our ancestors 
who believed SD had an advantage over our ancestors who believed alternatives to it, the intuitive 
reason that they did is that a corresponding hypothesis about the structure of our environments was 
true. 
 I conclude that the argument that we would not be selected to have true moral beliefs shows 
equally that we would not be selected to have true mathematical beliefs. Creatures with mathematical 
beliefs roughly like ours would have been more successful at passing on their genes than creatures 
with very different mathematical beliefs even if the mathematical truths were very different.67  
 
He does sidestep the question of whether we were selected to have true mathematical beliefs. His 
aim here is only to show here that those ancestors who believed that 1 + 1 = 2 would’ve had a 
greater chance of survival over those who believed 1 + 1 = 0 because there is a corresponding 
first-order logical truth that corresponds to the former equation and not the latter. 
Clarke-Doane anticipates the response that it is not possible to conceive mathematical 
truths being very different (as he presumed prior to this point), but that it is conceivable to 
imagine moral truths being very different, and thus, the epistemic analogy does not hold. It is the 
case that, given that moral disagreements have been hedged for millennia, if the realist can give 
an account for our having many true moral beliefs, it cannot be by a trivial explanation.  
Clarke-Doane clarifies that there are two types of proof: logical proof, and justificatory 
proof. The former shows that a conjecture follows from given axioms. A logical proof cannot 
 
67 See Clarke-Doane, 2012: p. 332. 
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prove that the conjectures are true whenever the axioms are themselves in doubt. The axioms are 
taken to be true for the sake of the proof, but the axioms are not proved true by it. In a 
justificatory proof, a conjecture is shown to be true, given that the axioms are not in doubt. Now, 
if the language of morality could be regimented in a formal manner and some moral statements 
assigned as axioms, Clarke-Doane explains that morality would enjoy a commensurate 
consensus regarding moral conclusions, given that what follows from axioms simply then 
depends on the rules of logic.68 The next question is whether the conjectures of mathematics 
have been proved in a justificatory sense. There have been numerous debates concerning 
mathematical axioms at all levels of the field, from the (seemingly) most rudimentary arithmetic 
principles to the most abstruse principles of set theory. He cites John Bell and Geoffrey Hellman:  
Contrary to the popular (mis)conception of mathematics as a cut-and-dried body of universally agreed 
upon truths…as soon as one examines the foundations of mathematics [the question of what axioms 
are true] one encounters divergences of viewpoint…that can easily remind one of religious, 
schismatic controversy.69 70 
 
This is not to say that elementary claims in mathematics, such as 1 + 1 = 2, are false, given that 
any substantive mathematical truths exist at all. Disagreements of the sort he, Bell, and Hellman 
are referring to do not turn on whether there are any substantive mathematical truths, but rather, 
assuming those truths exist, what their exact nature is. In the same vein, Clarke-Doane notes that 
he knows of no philosopher who assents to the existence of substantive moral truths and 
simultaneously denies rudimentary moral claims, such as one shouldn’t torture children for one’s 
amusement.  
 Bringing it all together, he explains: 
 
68 As to why morality is behind the ball here as opposed to mathematics, Leibniz writes, “If geometry were as much 
opposed to our passions and present interest as is ethics, we would contest it and violate it but little less not 
withstanding all the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes,” (New Essays on Human Understanding, Book II, 
Chapter ii, §12, paragraph 2). 
69 See Clarke-Doane, 2012: p. 336. 
70 He is rewording a quote from Bell & Hellman: 2006, p. 64. 
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Nevertheless, it is worth repeating that to say that it is intelligible to imagine that, say, 1 + 1 = 0, 
realistically construed, is not to say that it is intelligible to imagine that a marble on the table and a 
marble on the floor make no marbles in all. Again, the latter claim is a (first-order) logical truth (or, 
perhaps, an impure set-theoretic or mereological truth). To say that it is intelligible to imagine that 1 + 
1 = 0 is to say that it is intelligible to imagine that the number 1 bears the plus relation to itself and to 
0—or, more exactly, in the present context, that it is intelligible to imagine that, given that there are 
substantive mathematical truths at all, the number 1 bears the plus relation to itself and to 0. 
Arguably, the latter claim is at least suggested by the existence of disagreement among apparently 
conceptually competent people—people who concede that there are (substantive) mathematical 
truths—over such fundamentals of arithmetic as that every natural number has a successor. 
I conclude that the (non-question-begging) argument that it is intelligible to imagine the 
moral truths being very different shows equally that it is intelligible to imagine the mathematical 
truths being very different.71  
 
Separating the mathematical claim from the logical, he makes apparent that a trivial explanation 
for the mathematical beliefs we’ve formed is just as untenable as a trivial explanation for the 
moral beliefs we’ve formed. Thus, he shows that the evolutionary challenge for moral realism is 
equally a challenge for mathematical realism72 in light of two reasons: one, the argument that we 
were not selected to have true moral beliefs shows equally that we were not selected to have true 
mathematical beliefs, since we can imagine the mathematical truths being highly different; and 
two, that the non-question-begging argument that it’s possible to imagine the moral truths being 
highly different can also demonstrate that it’s possible to imagine the mathematical truths being 
highly different, as well. There are several upshots to all of this, but I’ll focus on two. One is that 
the evolutionary challenge doesn’t mean the moral realist can’t use any explanation in the 
accounting for our having many true moral beliefs, merely that he or she can’t use an 
evolutionary or trivial explanation.73 Secondly, there seem to be no epistemological grounds 
upon which one can simultaneously be a mathematical realist and a moral antirealist. This is not 
to say the epistemological argument for the moral realist has been defused; rather, it seems that 
 
71 See Clarke-Doane, 2012: p. 338. 
72 When both begin axiomatically. 
73 If the system of morals is constructed like mathematics (i.e., beginning from unprovable axioms), that is. 
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this should equally destabilize our justifications for having true mathematical beliefs when either 
type of belief is the conclusion of an axiomatic system. 
 
4.2. GÖDEL & THE BENACERRAF-FIELD CHALLENGE 
Clarke-Doane’s conclusions in the prior sections follow naturally from the conclusions of 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. The first theorem demonstrates that for any strong, formal 
system S, it is possible to find a consistent extension of S, T, that would bring forth a false 
sentence. Therefore, though S can be shown to be consistent, S cannot be shown to be true from 
within S. This holds for any system of math or morals that begins from a priori axioms; math 
cannot prove math to be true, nor morals of morality’s veracity. Gödel’s second theorem of 
incompleteness demonstrated that for any axiomatic system T, a statement expressing T’s 
consistency is undemonstrable from within T.74 Math or morals detached from their 
corresponding first- or second- order logical principles (as with the case of the marbles75) cannot 
be shown by their axioms nor logical proofs to be consistent. Clarke-Doane is doubtful, then, that 
Harman’s argument that mathematical beliefs are more warranted than moral beliefs still stands. 
This concern arises not only by light of the epistemological arguments he presents, but also due 
to new arguments in the philosophy of mathematics he briefly touches upon that follow Gödel’s 
theorems. He gives the example that mathematics, realistically construed, have recently been 
shown to be superfluous to our empirical scientific theories: if the mathematics that undergirds 
 
74 See Sterpetti, 2019: pp. 229, 241. 
75 Refer to the quote from Clarke-Doane on page 40. 
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those theories were reconstrued into antirealist terms, the theories would still stand, and “all 
apparent talk of numbers, sets, and tensors and so on is redundant anyway.”76 77  
Despite these objections, most mathematicians (and, paradoxically, proponents of the 
EDA) maintain that the conclusions of mathematics are, in Clarke-Doane’s justificatory sense, 
certainly proved.78 To be consistent, if, for the sake of argument, the first axioms for morality 
were agreed upon and from those logical proofs were derived, they would have to say these 
moral conclusions are equally proved in the justificatory sense as their mathematics. The fact of 
the matter is, though, that neither seem justifiably believed. 
What follows is the essence of the Benacerraf-Field Challenge. This challenge, in brief, 
comes first from an objection in mathematical philosophy raised by Paul Benacerraf. He 
postulates: 
I find [mathematical realism] both encouraging and troubling. What troubles me is that without an 
account of how the [intuitive mathematical] axioms "force themselves upon us as being true,"79 the 
analogy with sense perception and physical science is without much content. For what is missing 
is…an account of the link between our cognitive faculties and the objects known. In physical science 
we have at least a start on such an account, and it is causal…[S]omething must be said to bridge the 
chasm, created by…[a] realistic…interpretation of mathematical propositions, between the entities 
that form the subject matter of mathematics and the human knower.80  
 
He articulates a trouble that naturally arises from the conclusions of Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems: his concern is that there remains a disturbing noetic gap between our minds and the 
conclusions of axiomatic systems, or, more specifically, these mind-independent, causally inert 
 
76 See Clarke-Doane, 2012: p. 339. 
77 Note, too, that this can pose a problem for moral realists, particularly the moral naturalists. If moral properties can 
be reduced to natural elements in the environment that play a causal role in that environment’s emergence, it can be 
said that a moral explanation of those emergent phenomena, then, would be redundant to the preexisting naturalistic 
explanation. See Street’s point on ontological parsimony in Section 2.3.1. We will investigate later if by positing 
that the existence of morals provides a better explanation for the contents of our beliefs than evolution, psychology, 
or sociology, whether this point of ontological parsimony loses its punch. See Section 5 for this discussion. 
78 Again, see Joyce, 2006: pp. 182-190; Cellucci, 2017: Sec. 20.12 
79 Citing Gödel, 1947: 1990, p. 268. 
80 See Benacerraf, 1973: pp. 674-675. 
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mathematical properties. To illustrate this point, Clarke-Doane gives the example “2 is a prime 
number,” writing, “…whatever the literal relata of causation, it does not seem that mathematical 
objects or properties could participate in them,” or that “the number 2, the property of being 
prime, 2’s being prime, or the fact that 2 is prime, could cause anything. These remarks make it 
hard to see how we could know that 2 is prime.”81 A couple decades later, Hartry Field turned 
this observation into a direct challenge against mathematical realism. Field notes: 
 
We grant…that there may be positive reasons for believing in [mathematical] entities…[T]he 
challenge…is to…explain how our beliefs about these remote entities can so well reflect the facts 
about them…[I]f it appears in principle impossible to explain this, then that tends to undermine the 
belief in mathematical entities, despite whatever reason we might have for believing in them.82  
 
 
Field takes Benacerraf’s more casual observation and turns it into a direct challenge against 
mathematical realists, asking how material beings can come into intellectual contact with 
immaterial things like mathematical entities. Thus, we have the Benacerraf-Challenge: 
 
Benacerraf-Field Challenge: It appears in principle impossible to explain our reliability with respect to 
truths that are both about causally inert objects and that predicate causally inert properties.83  
 
 
The Benacerraf-Field Challenge, raised both to mathematical realists and moral realists alike, 
makes the assertion that no reliable account can be given as to how flesh-and-blood beings can 
know with certainty mind-independent, causally inert objects nor their causally inert properties.  
This is where I think Clarke-Doane misses the mark. He tries to defuse the Benacerraf-
Field’s attack on moral realism by arguing that mathematical truths only describe mathematical 
objects’ mathematical properties, while moral truths describe nonmoral objects’ moral 
 
81 See Clarke-Doane, 2011: pp. 86-87. 
82 See Field, 1988: pp. 25-26. 
83 See Clarke-Doane, 2011: p. 89. 
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properties. If this holds, then it would be the case that moral truths are not both about causally 
inert objects and their causally inert properties like mathematics. Instead, moral truths would be 
about causally active objects that predicate causally inert properties. If so, then moral truths 
sidestep the Benacerraf-Field Challenge. To illustrate his point, he refers to his example of “two 
is a prime number.” “2” is an abstract mathematical object, and the property of being “prime” 
can only be applied to certain mathematical objects (i.e., numbers). Moral principles, on the 
other hand, describe moral properties of nonmoral objects, such as “people, actions, and events,” 
eliciting statements such as, “Hitler’s actions were evil,” or “liberating America’s slaves was 
good,” he writes.84  
The problem is that moral truths don’t have to only ever describe nonmoral objects, nor 
do mathematical truths need to only describe mathematical objects. For example, we can say that 
“this group of people has the mathematical property of being four entities,” or that “justice is a 
higher moral good than clemency.” Therefore, mathematical truths and moral truths alike seem 
subject to the Benacerraf-Field Challenge, despite Clarke-Doane’s conclusion in his dissertation.  
Notice that Street’s Darwinian Dilemma essentially asks the same questions: how can 
products of evolution such as ourselves have formed accurate and reliable beliefs about causally 
inert objects and the causally inert properties they predicate? Even if knowledge of such entities 
and properties were possible, why would natural selection have favored detection of their 
existence? Notice, too, that this challenge poses a danger for both the naturalists and the non-
naturalists. The naturalists, who aver that morals are substantiated in the natural world, cannot 
seem to explain how evolution would have favored the detection of their properties that play no 
causal role in that natural world. The non-naturalists must account for how natural beings can 
 
84 Ibid. 
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come to knowledge of non-natural entities as well as their causally inert properties. The question 
remains, then, if knowledge of mind-independent, causally inert moral properties is even 
possible for us. The remainder of this thesis will not seek to provide a thoroughly satisfactory 
answer to this question but merely outline possible strategies the moral realist could use in the 
development of an answer. I’ll present a few accounts that attempt to disarm the Benacerraf-
Field evolutionary challenge to moral realism. 
 
5. HOW CAN WE TRACK MORAL TRUTHS? 
5.1. ADDRESSING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 
The first question is whether we have the capacity to know the existence of mind-
independent, causally inert properties at all. I will briefly discuss the epistemological strategies 
of moral realists Wielenberg, Enoch, and others. 
Wielenberg sketches a modest account of how we could come to knowledge of such 
morals.85 Specifically, he notes that across cultures, humans have developed (or, perhaps, 
recognized) the notion that we all have certain moral barriers, whether they are called personal 
rights, duties, or legitimate desires.86 Certainly, as Joyce notes in Chapter 4 of Evolution of 
Morality, there would have been a survivability advantage to this notion, given that such a notion 
facilitates social cohesion.87 Wielenberg considers two possible proximate methods by which we 
could have come to know these moral barriers: by intuition, or by emotion; his model accounts 
for a wide variety of such possible proximation methods, though. The bottom line is that in the 
 
85 See Wielenberg, 2010. 
86 Ibid, p. 445. 
87 See Joyce, 2006: Chapter 4. 
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presence of certain cognitive capacities, beliefs of moral barriers arise. He thereby establishes a 
causal connection to moral barriers and moral rights by saying that the presence of these 
cognitive faculties precipitates belief in those moral barriers. Presuming, too, that evolution 
produces reliable belief-forming processes and that those beliefs tend to be true,88 then it’s 
reasonable to expect that evolution would’ve formed mostly true, reliable moral beliefs, and if 
such beliefs are indeed produced by a reliable process, then those beliefs have warrant, he 
explains.89 David Enoch proposes a similar but more general scheme in which A-facts and B-
facts are united by citing a third factor, C, which is responsible for both: in this case, drawing our 
normative beliefs and normative truths together by recognizing that survival is good.90  
The advantage is that both accounts appear to provide a workable foundation for showing 
the epistemic possibility in acquiring true knowledge about moral laws if they exist. Namely, 
seeing as how evolution naturally selects for those creatures that are increasingly better at 
adapting to veridical truths about their environments, if morals exist and somehow either 
constitute in part or supervene over the physical world (as the naturalists and non-naturalists 
would argue, respectively), then those creatures who could adapt to those truths would’ve likely 
seen a greater survivability advantage.  
 
88 See Carruthers, 1992: p. 113 for this argument. 
89 There are a few shortcomings with this account specifically, however. The most critical, in my opinion, is that he 
takes a position not unlike Kantian constructivism, in that objective morals are contingent upon the existence of an 
agent of certain cognitive capacities. Unequivocally, he explains that “[s]uch faculties are responsible for the 
presence of moral rights in that the presence of the relevant faculties entails the presence of rights,” (2010: p. 450). 
In this sense, it could be said that Wielenberg-morals have a causal account but are therefore not mind-independent. 
If he intends to say that they are mind-independent, then he loses the argument that Wielenberg-morals have a causal 
explanation, namely those cognitive faculties. So either his morals are mind-independent, or they are causally inert, 
but not both. It is argued that both conditions are metaphysically necessary properties of realist morals. It seems, 
then, he has not provided the account the realists need to defuse the metaphysical side of the Darwinian Benacerraf-
Field challenge, but it could aid on the epistemic side. Ideally, however, both sides would be covered by one and the 
same account. 
90 See Enoch, 2010: pp. 429-432. 
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There are a few drawbacks, too. Both accounts seem to require that morals remain 
completely causally inefficacious. Klenk notes, too, that by explaining the content of our moral 
beliefs without appealing to moral properties as is done here, Street’s ALA still comes out 
superior on the point of ontological parsimony.91 Therefore, rather than beginning by proposing 
the existence of a third-factor or requisite cognitive faculty to get moral realism off the ground 
epistemically, it seems wiser for the moral realist to first show that no evolutionary account is 
complete (or at the very least, sufficient) in its explanation of our moral beliefs without appealing 
to the existence of corresponding real moral laws, eliminating the concern that moral realism 
posits the existence of something ontologically superfluous. 
Non-natural moral realists have also attempted to bridge the noetic gap between mortals 
and morals by saying that human beings have material bodies but immaterial intellects.92 93 
While this would assuage Field’s concern, this seems to me a more difficult position to defend 
than an evolutionary account of the kind seen earlier in this thesis.  
Having addressed a few epistemic strategies and concerns relevant to the moral realist, 
I’ll turn now to how a moral realist may address the question of providing an ontological account 
of moral realism that can avoid a slash from Occam’s Razor. 
 
5.2 ADDRESSING THE ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE. 
In his paper paralleling a conundrum within philosophy of mind to positing ethical 
realism, William J. FitzPatrick explains how an ontology accounting for ethical realism may fit 
 
91 See Klenk, 2017: p. 784. 
92 See FitzPatrick, 2018; Rizzi, 2004. 
93 While I think it more difficult, I won’t say that it is impossible. See Section 5.2 for how FitzPatrick has recently 
attempted to carve out a similar position. 
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squarely in a natural explanation for a value-laden world.94 He points out that the individual who 
claims that phenomenal experiences cannot be reduced to functional states or explained without 
deflating such experiences already possesses a non-physical metaphysics of mind to allow for the 
existence of these phenomenal facts. There is a possibility that if non-physicalism best accounts 
for phenomenal facts in philosophy of mind, then ethical non-naturalism may best account for 
the apparent “obviousness” of the content of the moral beliefs we tend to hold. Though it could 
very well be the case that there exists an entirely naturalistic explanation for the phenomenon of 
consciousness, in which case, the analogy tumbles. However, FitzPatrick explains, that if 
phenomena of experience cannot be deflated, reduced to naturalistic terms, or accurately deemed 
illusory, then what may provide the best explanation for them is to posit a non-physical reality in 
which these phenomena subsist. However, scientific inquiry into these mental phenomena is still 
in progress and, for this reason, many believe that a natural explanation for consciousness is 
merely “on the way.” In ethics, however, the presumption behind the discussion for ethical or 
moral realism is that as much as is needed to know about the natural world to provide a sufficient 
explanation for our moral beliefs is already known.95 Therefore, we have seen a rejection of 
morals as illusory or seen moral beliefs deflated or reduced to naturalistic (i.e., evolutionarily 
explicable) terms (as socially advantageous moves, an expression of desires, etc.). FitzPatrick, in 
effort to not distort ethical experiences as anything except as they present themselves to be, 
views the natural world as more ontologically replete than the scientific process alone can 
capture. Comparing the position of Non-Scientistic Physicalism in philosophy of mind to Non-
Scientistic Naturalism, he concludes that this may be the most plausible explanation for ethical 
 
94 See FitzPatrick, 2018. 
95 I think it’s safe to say that this is the position of our three proponents of the EDA, Ruse, Joyce, and Street. 
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experiences. Anticipating rebuttal along the lines of citing something ontologically superfluous 
or too exotic, he writes: 
To object that this is “spooky” is doubly misguided, just as in the case of consciousness: it assumes 
that we know so much about the world through scientific inquiry as to know that the default is that it 
should not contain value (or phenomenal experience), or that it is somehow highly unlikely that it 
should; and it assumes that such things are unlike anything we have run across in experience, as if we 
were positing flying horses.96  
 
My greatest concern for this position is that it teeters dangerously on an appeal to ignorance. 
While it may be the case that consciousness as well as ethical phenomena, the kind that we 
would shape our moral beliefs around, have no reducible explanations yet just as well constitute 
veridical elements of reality, it could also be the case that a chemical account of consciousness is 
on the horizon and that the evolutionary picture painted earlier in this thesis provides a complete, 
reducible account for ethical phenomena. 
 I foresee several challenges for the moral realist when the time comes to address this 
ontological issue. If the moral realist wants to provide a naturalistic account for morals, then they 
must do so in a way that survives being reduced to other natural phenomena such as in terms of 
physical, biochemical, psychological, or sociological laws such that the moral dimension is not 
rendered “redundant” (like mathematics97). If, however, they propose an ontology for morals that 
is non-naturalistic, their explanation must not be ontologically superfluous to the evolutionary 
accounts given earlier but superior in explanatory power than those. I am personally unsure of 
how to construct such a case, but I think if any such can be made, FitzPatrick is on the best path 
to do so. 
 
 
96 See FitzPatrick, 2018: p. 545. 
97 See the quote from Clarke-Doane on pages 41-42. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS: MOVING FORWARD REALISTICALLY. 
 I have presented the arguments of Michael Ruse, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street. I 
have delineated Guy Kahane’s structure for the EDA and assessed its susceptibility to self-
defeat. I have revealed the metaphysical presumptions underpinning and, therefore, undermining 
Ruse’s, Joyce’s, and Street’s positions. I showed how Justin Clarke-Doane epistemically linked 
the EDA’s attack on moral realism to mathematical realism, which aided in demonstrating the 
gravity of the Benacerraf-Field Challenge to moral realism. Finally, I presented some strategies 
moral realists may use against evolutionary concerns raised against their account. 
 I think the question remains as to how humans could ever have knowledge of abstract 
entities and their properties, if such entities exist at all. The hypothesis of an immaterial intellect 
intrigues me the most, given, too, the conjunction of the conundrum of consciousness from a 
naturalistic standpoint. However, this is also a rather metaphysically exotic position, and I think 
the most elegant account for the content of our moral beliefs is still in the hands of the 
evolutionary biologists. This is not by the merit of the EDA, however. The EDA’s error of citing 
an off-track process to undermine justification in one set of beliefs is, frankly, too narrow. If the 
EDA is right, then the reliability for all our knowledge should come into question––though, one 
could argue based on that fact, that we should even question our desire to now question that 
judgement, too––and so an infinite regress of doubt is generated. No, I think the real challenge to 
moral realism comes not from the EDA but from the Benacerraf-Field Challenge in Darwinian 
disguise. 
 Here’s what I’ll say to the Benacerraf-Field Challenge. To whatever degree humans are 
capable of intaking veridical data about their environment, if morals constitute or contribute 
some unique, macrophysical dimension to that environment and a connection between such 
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entities and our minds is possible, then it is reasonable, I think, to suspect that we have, at the 
very least, increasingly gravitated towards a more accurate ability to descry the presence of such 
entities around us, as we have improved our other senses in respect to their corresponding 
macrophysical objects over the course of our evolutionary history. If morals exist and we can 
come to know them, then likely, we have become better acquainted with them and will continue 
to do so. However, for this to become a viable account, I charge the moral realists to bring 
forward an account of morals that is superior to those presented at the front end of this thesis. It 
must both (1) provide an epistemology of how beings like us can know entities like morals, and 
(2) provide an ontology that shows that the existence of morals is not superfluous to our 
scientific explanation but better encompasses and thereby explains the gambit of our ethical 
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